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The Harmonisation Potential of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 
 
Filippo Fontanelli* and Amedeo Arena** 
 
Abstract 
This article discusses two underrated and connected aspects that determine the applicability 
of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights to Member State measures. First, the Charter can 
be a decisive standard of review for domestic measures only when they are covered by EU law 
but are not precluded by it. In this respect, the distinction between non-preclusion and non-
application of EU law has been overlooked by legal scholarship. Second, because the scope of 
application of EU law and that of the Charter are identical, the latter suffers from the same 
uncertainties as the former. This article concludes that the entry into force of the Charter has 
exposed the blurred contours of the application of EU law, in particular in the area of the 
market freedoms. As a result, a certain spontaneous harmonisation of human rights protection 
has emerged. 
 
Keywords 
Market freedoms; spontaneous harmonisation; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; Court 
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A Introduction 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) binds EU institutions 
and Member States when they are implementing EU law.1 Thus, it does not apply to State 
measures outside the scope of application of EU law, including those beyond the reach of the 
EU rules on free movement. The Twitter version of this article, therefore, would read: “the 
Charter neither restricts nor enlarges the application to domestic measures of EU law rules, 
including the rules on the market freedoms.” There is, in other words, no direct harmonisation 
effect in the application of the Charter. 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth observing how this symbiotic relation between the Charter and EU 
law – the Fransson-equivalence, as it were2 – works out in practice. Notably, when the scope 
of application of EU law has imprecise boundaries, so has the Charter, and this happens 
frequently when the EU law at stake is the law of the common market and of EU citizenship. 
Whereas the uncertainty mostly resolves itself (domestic measures are either prohibited by EU 
                                                 
* Senior lecturer, University of Edinburgh, filippo.fontanelli@ed.ac.uk.  
** Associate professor, Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, a.arena@unina.it. The work is the outcome 
of both authors’ collaboration. Amedeo Arena drafted sectons A to C, Filippo Fontanelli drafted sections D to G. 
A previous version of this work appeared in M Andenas, T Bekkedal and L Pantaleo (Eds.), The Reach of Free 
Movement, Springer, TMC Asser Press, 2017, pp. 293-312.  
1 Article 51(1) of the Charter. See also Cs. I. Nagy, ‘Est-ce que l’Union européenne devrait avoir le pouvoir de 
forcer les états membres à respecter les droits de l’homme ? Une analyse prospective relative à l’application de la 
charte des droits fondamentaux aux états membres’, Revue de Droit International et de Droit Comparé, Vol. 94, 
No. 3, 2017, pp. 510. 
2 The Fransson equivalence dictates that the scope of application of EU law and the Charter to State measures is 
the same, ratione materiae. Whereas (then) President Skouris praised the Fransson-equivalence, it arguably 
creates more problems than it solves. See, respectively, V. Skouris, ‘Développements Récents de la Protection 
des Droits Fondamentaux dans l’Union Européenne: Les Arrêts Melloni et Åkerberg Fransson’, Il Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea, 2013, No. 2, 229-243 and F. Fontanelli, ‘Implementation of European Union Law by 
Member States under Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’, Columbia Journal of European Law, 
Vol. 20, 2013, pp. 193-247. 
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law or are not, regardless of whether they are allowed or just not contemplated), in certain cases 
it has consequential effects: these are the cases of non-preclusion. 
 
One of the central points of this article is the underrated importance of non-precluded measures. 
More precisely, it is argued that State measures that are not precluded by EU law are the 
springboard of the Charter’s indirect harmonisation effects. It is important to delineate the 
category of non-precluded measures accurately, before expanding on its implications.3 To 
assess the impact of the Charter, it is indispensable to observe the application of EU law to 
domestic measures at large, as the application of the Charter and the application of EU law go 
hand in hand. This alignment carries within a simplification (the Charter’s application overlaps 
with the application of EU law) and a complication (the scope of application of EU law is 
uncertain). 
 
The question of State acts’ compliance with EU law is normally fashioned as a binary 
determination. Either a State act breaches EU law, and is therefore unlawful, or it does not, and 
is therefore lawful. For instance, Article 34 TFEU prohibits national measures which restrict 
the imports of goods from other Member States. These measures are therefore unlawful: 
domestic courts are required to put them aside.4 Conversely, Article 34 TFEU does not preclude 
quantitative restrictions on imports justified on grounds of public security,5 nor does it prohibit 
measures that do not entail a quantitative restriction. These measures are therefore lawful, as a 
matter of EU law, and will apply. 
 
However, the dichotomy is somewhat simplistic because it obfuscates a further distinction. A 
prohibition of door-step-selling of jewellery, which does not restrict cross-border trade in 
goods, is simply not covered by Article 34 TFEU.6 On the contrary, a ban on equipment 
increasing the power of mopeds which seeks to protect human health is covered, but not 
precluded, by Article 34 TFEU insofar as it can be justified under Article 36 TFEU.7 The 
former measure lies outside the scope of EU law altogether, whilst the latter falls within the 
scope of EU law, but does not breach it. The two categories of non-covered and non-precluded 
measure must be examined separately. 
 
This article observes, in succession, the received knowledge regarding State measures that fall 
outside the scope of EU law and State measures that fall under EU law, but are not precluded 
by it. It then maps the blurred division between such categories, to identify the problems that, 
in turn, affect the reach of EU law and the Charter at once. One of the striking effects of this 
theoretical blur is that, ultimately, State authorities might choose to follow the Charter just out 
of precaution, accelerating its unintended harmonisation effects. 
 
Our main conclusion is that this theoretical uncertainty is regrettable, and that one of the 
unintended effects of the Charter’s growing application is that the CJEU (the Court) has 
gradually come under an enormous pressure to address the long-ignored problem of the precise 
application of EU law to domestic measures. 
                                                 
3 The importance of non-precluded measures under the Charter is discussed in F Fontanelli, ‘Implementation of 
EU Law through Domestic Measures after Fransson: the Court of Justice Buys Time and ‘Non-preclusion’ 
Troubles Loom Large’, European Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2014, pp. 682-700. 
4 Article 34 TFEU. 
5 Article 36 TFEU. 
6 Case C-441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v Claudia Schmidt, EU:C:2006:141, para 30. 
7 Case C-142/09, Criminal proceedings against Vincent Willy Lahousse and Lavichy BVBA, EU:C:2010:694, 
paras 43-48. 
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B Non-covered measures and the application of EU law 
 
Non-covered measures are those measures that do not breach EU law because they do not fall 
under its reach in the first place. Their identification implicates knowing the contours of the 
application of EU law. However, whether EU law applies to a specific State measure is a 
question that often cannot be answered with certainty.8  
 
The scope of application of EU law is certainly related to the reach of EU competences. 
However, whether the EU has competence over certain matters is a poor predictor of whether 
a certain matter falls under the scope of EU law. First, the exact boundaries of the competences 
listed in Articles 3-6 TFEU are difficult to draw in abstracto.9 The “internal market”, for 
instance, is more of a goal than a specific subject-matter. Second, a measure may fall in an area 
where the EU has a non-exclusive competence, but it has not yet enacted EU legislation in that 
matter or the relevant EU acts are no longer in force.10 In such scenario, unless the national 
measure is in breach of obligations laid down in the Treaties, the existence of EU competences 
does not warrant the inference that the measure falls within the scope of EU law.11 Third, and 
conversely, the absence of EU competences in the area regulated by the national measure is no 
guarantee that such a measure lies beyond the reach of EU law. While, in principle, Member 
States are free to legislate in areas where the Treaties have not conferred competences upon the 
Union, they still cannot exercise those competences in a manner inconsistent with EU law.12  
                                                 
8 See C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige, EU:C:2016:970. The judgment grapples with the apparent contradiction between 
Article 1(3) and Article 15(1) of the e-privacy Directive 2002/58. Whereas the first provision seems to exclude 
public security measures from the Directive’s application, the latter seems to authorise them. In other words, it is 
not clear whether certain national measures are not-covered or not-precluded by the Directive. The Court opted 
for the latter view, see para 75-79. See also the General Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe 
EU:C:2016:572, para 92-97. 
9 For instance, legal commentators have highlighted the difficulty in determining the exact boundaries of the EU 
exclusive competence in the area of the “establish[ment] of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market” as per Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. See, for instance, A. Dashwood, ‘The relationship between the 
Member States and the European Union/European Community’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
2004, p. 371 (Arguing that such definition is inaccurate.); R Mastroianni, ‘Le competenze dell”Unione’, Il Diritto 
dell”Unione Europea, 2005, p. 398 (Noting that the above definition adopts the pre-Lisbon teleological approach 
to the vertical division of powers.); R Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: a Prospective 
Analysis’, European Law Review, Vol. 33, 2008, p. 717 (Arguing that the drafters have fallen victim to an 
“ontological fallacy” insofar as the category of “rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market” does 
“not, by definition, require the exclusion of all national action within their scope”.). 
10 In Tele2 Sverige, for instance, at stake was the regulatory gap left by the annulment of the Data Retention 
Directive, and whether its implementing regulations could fall under Article 15(1) of the e-privacy Directive 
2002/58. 
11 See Case C-198/13, Víctor Manuel Julian Hernández and Others v Reino de España (Subdelegación del 
Gobierno de España en Alicante) and Other, EU:C:2014:2055, para 36 (“[T]he mere fact that a national measure 
comes within an area in which the European Union has powers cannot bring it within the scope of EU law”). See 
also Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10, Gueye and Salmerón Sánchez, EU:C:2011:583, paras 55, 69 & 70 and 
Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756, paras 104-105 & 180-181. 
12 See Case C-348/96, Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa, EU:C:1999:6, para 17 (“Although in 
principle criminal legislation is a matter for which the Member States are responsible, the Court has consistently 
held that Community law sets certain limits to their power, and such legislation may not restrict the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by Community law.”). See also Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v Trésor public, 
EU:C:1989:47, para 19; Case 203/80, Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati, EU:C:1981:261, para 27. 
More recently, in a case relating to the right to residence of EU citizens and third country citizens, see the reasoning 
of the Court in Case C-165/14, Alfredo Rendón Marín, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, para 75: “although [these situations] 
are governed by legislation which falls, a priori, within the competence of the Member States, namely legislation 
on the right of entry and residence of third-country nationals outside the scope of provisions of secondary 
legislation which provide for the grant of such a right under certain conditions, they nonetheless have an intrinsic 
4 
 
 
The latter scenario arises regularly in the operation of the market freedoms. Whereas EU 
legislation promotes positive integration of the common market through the approximation of 
domestic laws, the market freedoms as protected in the Treaties reflect a model of negative 
integration. Under the Treaty provisions on the four freedoms, States are not asked to adopt 
specific conduct, but are enjoined from raising trade obstacles, irrespective of what matter they 
might be regulating. The principle of conferral, which delineates the outer limits of EU 
competence, thus cannot constrain the reach of the EU market freedoms ratione materiae. 
 
To determine whether a certain domestic measure falls under the TFEU free movement 
provisions, the Court established, among others, a test that does not rely on the attribution of 
competences but on the factual matrix of the situation at hand.13 This is the “purely internal 
situations” test. It relates to the practical coordinates of the case (the conduct, the nationality 
of the persons affected, the location of the interests involved). It is not a sophisticated legal test 
but it is founded on a plausible assumption: when a factual scenario has no trans-border 
element, it can be presumed that EU law does not apply to it.14 The same remarks apply, in 
essence, to the exercise of citizenship rights – a field where the “purely internal situation” test 
has often been the only relatively reliable device to police the interplay between EU and 
domestic law. 
 
Cases like Rottman,15 Viking,16 Wittgenstein17 and Pfleger18 illustrate very well the grasp of 
EU market freedoms and citizenship rights over matters where the Treaties did not confer any 
competence on the EU. These cases arose in the application of rules governing the withdrawal 
of German citizenship, the UK regime of strike rights, the Austrian rules prohibiting the use of 
nobility titles and Austrian criminal law punishing the use of unlicensed gambling machines. 
All these measures have at least one crucial aspect in common: they governed matters that, 
according to the principle of conferral, should rest with the Member States. Nonetheless, all 
these measures had an impact on the exercise of a market freedom or an EU citizenship right. 
                                                 
connection with the freedom of movement and residence of a Union citizen, which prevents the right of entry and 
residence being refused to those nationals in the Member State of residence of that citizen, in order not to interfere 
with that freedom.” 
13 That test is firmly grounded in the wording of several TFEU provisions in the area of internal market: Articles 
30 and 34 TFEU prohibit custom duties and quantitative restrictions in trade “between Member States”; Article 
45(1) TFEU, concerning the free movement of workers, expressly refers to “nationality”; Article 49 TFEU, 
prohibiting restrictions on establishment “by citizens of a Member States in the territory of another Member 
State”; Article 56 TFEU, in turn, prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services “in respect of national 
of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are 
intended”; finally, Article 69 TFEU prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital “between Member States, 
as well as between Member States and third countries”.    
14 See A Arena, ‘I limiti della competenza pregiudiziale della Corte di giustizia in presenza di situazioni puramente 
interne: la sentenza Sbarigia’, Diritto dell’Unione Europea, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 207 (Noting that the Court’s 
“traditional” approach to purely internal situations implies that the existence of a cross-border element in the 
case’s factual matrix entails the presumption that the national measure has an impact on cross-border trade.). See 
also A Tryfonidou, ‘The Outer Limits of Article 28 EC: Purely Internal Situations and the Development of the 
Court’s Approach through the Years’, in C Barnard & O Odudu (Eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law, 
Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2009 p. 200 (“Under this approach … if the goods that are involved in the 
facts have remained confined within the territory of one and the same Member Sate, the situation immediately 
qualifies as purely internal and this signifies the end of the enquiry as to a possible violation of Article 28 EC”).  
15 Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104. 
16 Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union, 
EU:C:2007:772. 
17 Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, EU:C:2010:806. 
18 Case C-390/12, Pfleger and others, EU:C:2014:281. 
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As a result, these measures fell under the scope of EU law and some of them were ultimately 
in breach thereof. In all these cases the existence of a trans-border element (Mr Rottman’s 
previous Austrian citizenship, the trans-border operation of the Finnish ferry company, Ms 
Wittgenstein’s dealings with a non-Austrian administration, the criminal prosecution of Czech 
individuals in Austrian courts) was a better predictor of the application of EU law than the 
principle of conferral. As Advocate General Spuznar put it, “… it is precisely when they are 
exercising their powers that the Member States must take care to ensure that EU law is not 
deprived of its effectiveness.”19 
 
It might be tempting, then, to seek guidance as to the scope of EU law by looking at the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the context of the preliminary ruling 
procedure.20 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that its task is not to give advisory opinions 
“on general or hypothetical questions”21 and, in particular, that it may refuse to provide a 
preliminary ruling if “the interpretation of European Union law sought bears no relation to the 
actual facts of the main action”.22 
 
However, that approach is theoretically flawed because, in the context of the preliminary ruling 
procedure, the Court’s task is to rule on the interpretation (or validity) of EU law, not to its 
applicability in the main proceedings. It is thus no wonder that, according to settled case-law, 
the Court leaves it to the referring court to determine “both the need for a preliminary ruling in 
order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the 
Court.”23 
 
Moreover, such a “jurisdictional” criterion may yield false positives, i.e. situations where the 
Court provides a preliminary ruling although the situation at hand lies beyond the scope of EU 
law. In the context of the internal market, the Court has on several occasions provided 
preliminary rulings on a provision of EU law that did not apply to the main proceedings, 
because they concerned purely internal situations. For instance, in Dzodzi the Court ruled on 
the interpretation of EU provisions that were “made applicable” in the main proceedings by 
way of a reference contained in national provisions. The Court considered that it was 
“manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that, in order to forestall future 
differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be given a uniform 
interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied.”24 Likewise, in 
Guimont, the Court provided guidance on Article 34 TFEU even if the main proceedings 
concerned a purely internal situation, holding that a preliminary ruling can be useful when 
national law requires that a national producer enjoy the same rights as those enjoyed under EU 
law by a producer of another Member State in the same situation.25 
 
By the same token, the criterion in question may yield false negatives, i.e. situations where the 
Court declines its jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling in circumstances falling within the 
scope of EU law. For instance, the Court may refuse to answer a preliminary question if the 
referring court fails to define the factual and legislative context of the questions: in Z.Ś. and 
                                                 
19 Opinion in Case C-165/14, Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:75, para 113. 
20 See Case C-281/15, Sahyouni, EU:C:2016:343, para 23: “[i]t follows therefrom that neither the provisions of 
Regulation No 1259/2010, referred to by the referring court, nor those of Regulation No 2201/2003, nor any other 
legal act of the European Union applies to the dispute in the main proceedings.” 
21 Case C-212/04, Adeneler and others, EU:C:2006:443, para 42. 
22 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado, EU:C:2006:734, para 17. 
23 See, for instance, Case C-571/10, Kamberaj, EU:C:2012:233, para 40. 
24 Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, EU:C:1990:36, para 37. 
25 Case C-448/98, Guimont, EU:C:2000:663, para 23. 
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Others, the Court ruled that the request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 
8 of Regulation no. 561/2006 on road transport was inadmissible because the referring court 
did not specify what paragraph was the subject of its question and how the interpretation sought 
was necessary to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings.26 
 
C Non-precluded measures 
 
Non-precluded measures are Member State measures which fall under the scope of EU law and 
are in line the with the applicable EU provisions. They can arise under different circumstances, 
which are not mutually exclusive. A few examples can be mentioned.  
 
At the outset, the internal market fundamental freedoms envisage a number of express and 
implied derogations. National measures in accordance with those derogations fall within the 
scope of EU law, but are not precluded by it. Article 52(1) TFEU, for instance, provides that 
the right of establishment is no bar to national provisions granting special treatment for foreign 
nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.27 Moreover, the Court 
recognised a number of overriding reasons relating to the public interest that can serve as a 
justification for the introduction of indistinctly applicable restrictions at the national level.28 
Likewise, under Article 15(1) of the e-privacy Directive States can restrict the internet users’ 
rights granted by the Directive to pursue public security goals. By the same token, the Court 
acknowledged that Member States can take measures to prevent the abuse of the free movement 
provisions set out in the TFEU.29  
 
Furthermore, positive integration provisions laid down in EU legislation may also envisage 
areas of permissible national action falling within the scope of EU law. EU legislation may 
require the adoption of certain measures at the national level. Directives are an obvious 
example, although also certain provisions laid down in regulations may envisage 
implementation at the national level.30 In SGS Belgium, for instance, the Court ruled that States, 
                                                 
26 Case C-325/15, Z.Ś. and Others, EU:C:2016:107, paras 32-33. 
27 See also the express derogations laid down in Article 36, 45(3), 62, and 65 TFEU.  
28 For a non-exhaustive list, see Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v 
Commissariaat voor de Media, EU:C:1991:323, para 14: “the overriding reasons relating to the public interest 
which the Court has already recognized include professional rules intended to protect recipients of the service 
(Joined Cases 110/78 and 111/78 Van Wesemael [1979] ECR 35, paragraph 28); protection of intellectual property 
(Case 62/79 Coditel [1980] ECR 881); the protection of workers (Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 
19; Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco v EVI [1982] ECR 223, paragraph 14; Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa 
[1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18); consumer protection (Case 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, 
paragraph 20; Case 252/83 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 3713, paragraph 20; Case 205/84 Commission v 
Germany [1986] ECR 3755, paragraph 30; Case 206/84 Commission v Ireland [1986] ECR 3817, paragraph 20; 
Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 20; and Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 21), the 
conservation of the national historic and artistic heritage (Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 20); turning 
to account the archaeological, historical and artistic heritage of a country and the widest possible dissemination 
of knowledge of the artistic and cultural heritage of a country (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 17, 
and Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 21).” 
29 See, for instance, Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging 
voor de Metaalnijverheid, EU:C:1974:131, para 13; Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, EU:C:2006:544, para 35; Case C-212/97, Centros 
Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, EU:C:1999:126, para 24. 
30 Case C-403/98, Azienda Agricola Monte Arcosu Srl v Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, EU:C:2001:6, para 
26 (“[A]lthough […] the provisions of […] regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal 
systems without its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application, some of their 
provisions may none the less necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the 
Member States.”). 
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by setting administrative penalties on the economic operators identified in Regulation No 
2988/95 to protect EU’s financial interests, were implementing that Regulation.31  
 
EU legislation may, within its scope of application, expressly authorise certain categories of 
national measures.32 A case in point is that of minimum harmonisation clauses, enabling 
Member States to enact “stricter or more detailed” requirements, relative to the “floor” set by 
the EU legislature, as long as they do not exceed the “ceiling” set by EU primary law.33 Another 
example is that of EU legislation affording Member States different options: under the old 
version of the “Dublin” regulation,34 for instance, Member States could process an asylum 
request instead of returning the applicant back to the Member State of entry;35 similarly, under 
the Audiovisual media services directive, each Member State can decide either to prohibit 
product placement or to authorise it subject to a number of requirements set out in that 
directive.36 
 
Moreover, EU legislation may harmonise a certain matter only partially, thus enabling Member 
States to regulate other aspects of the same matter.37 For instance, in De Agostini,38 the Court 
ruled that although the Television Without Frontiers directive had harmonized national 
provisions on television advertising and sponsorship, it had done so “only partially”.39 
Accordingly, it could not be regarded as “excluding completely and automatically the 
application of rules other than those specifically concerning the broadcasting and distribution 
of programmes”,40 nor as precluding “the application of national rules with the general aim of 
consumer protection”,41 such as the Swedish ban on misleading advertising that applied also, 
but not only, to television advertising.42  
 
This category of rules probes the blurry line between non-preclusion and non-application: 
whereas a matter is regulated by EU law, some specific aspects of it are not. In the practice, it 
might be difficult to argue conclusively that national measures relating to the latter specific 
                                                 
31 Case C-367/09, Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau v SGS Belgium NV and Others, EU:C:2010:648, paras 
34-35. 
32 See, generally, A Arena, ‘Exercise of EU Competences and Pre-emption of Member States’ Powers in the 
Internal and the External Sphere: Towards ‘Grand Unification’?’, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 35, No. 1, 
2016, pp. 28-105.  
33 See, generally, F de Cecco, ‘Room to move? Minimum harmonization and fundamental rights’, Common Market 
Law Review, Vol. 43, 2006, pp. 9-30.; P Rott, ‘Minimum Harmonisation For the completion of the internal 
market? The example of consumer sales law’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 40, 2003, pp. 1107-1130.  
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national. 
35 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and others, EU:C:2011:865. On the new version of this provision 
(Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation), see Case C-578/16 PPU, C. K., H. F., A. S. v Republika Slovenija, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, para 54. 
36 Article 11 of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive).  
37 See R Schütze, ‘From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: the Changing Structure of European Law’, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 195: “[w]here European law does not harmonize all aspects within a policy 
area, Community terminology speaks of partial harmonization.” 
38 Joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95, and C-36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag 
AB (C-34/95) and TV-Shop i Sverige AB (C-35/95 and C-36/95), EU:C:1997:344. 
39 Ibid., para 32. 
40 Ibid., para 33. 
41 Ibid., para 34. 
42 Ibid., para 38. 
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issues are allowed by EU law, instead of them being irrelevant for EU law. Sometimes, the 
characterisation is a matter of convention or, worse, convenience. Some cases will be discussed 
below, to show the ambiguity of this category of rules. 
 
D The blurred line between non-preclusion and non-application 
 
It is now necessary to explain why the difference between non-preclusion and non-application 
is fundamental. It might be argued that the difference does not really come with a practical 
consequence: whether a domestic measure is not covered or not prohibited by EU law, it will 
simply be lawful under EU law. The case-law of the Court of Justice, indeed, has often reflected 
this nonchalant approach to the issue. 
 
For instance, the blurring is visible in the decisions of the Court regarding non-discriminatory 
measures regulating the opening hours of shops. In line with the Keck doctrine,43 the Court has 
regularly found that rules on shops’ opening times are selling arrangements (as opposed to 
product requirements) and therefore do not breach Art. 34 TFEU. In Turnhout,44 a 2014 case, 
the Court confidently noted that, as observed “on a number of occasions”, Articles 34 to 36 
TFEU “do not apply to national rules concerning the closure of shops” which are indistinctly 
applicable.45 To take but one example, consider how the Court addressed the same kind of 
measures in B&Q,46 a case of 1992: 
 
…the legislation at issue pursued an aim which was justified under Community law. 
National rules restricting the opening of shops on Sundays reflected certain choices 
relating to particular national or regional socio-cultural characteristics. It was for the 
Member States to make those choices in compliance with the requirements of 
Community law, in particular the principle of proportionality.47 
 
It is clear in this case that the Court, which confirmed the measure’s compliance with EU law 
requirements, hinted at non-preclusion, rather than non-application. However, the conclusion 
in the same case, which abruptly used the language of non-application, reveals that, in essence, 
the Court used non-application and non-preclusion interchangeably: 
 
…Article [34 TFEU] is to be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition which it lays 
down does not apply to national legislation prohibiting retailers from opening their 
premises on Sundays.48 
 
Indeed, in these cases the distinction would not come with a practical difference, and the 
Court’s conceptual oscillation is without consequence. However, there is at least one vital 
distinction which should call for a more rigorous separation between non-precluded and non-
covered State measures: general principles of EU law and the Charter only apply to non-
precluded measures.49 
 
                                                 
43 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905. 
44 Case C-483/12, Pelckmans Turnhout, ECLI:EU:C:2014:304. 
45 Ibid., para 24, emphasis added. 
46 Case C-169/91, Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council / B & Q Plc, EU:C:1992:519. 
47 Ibid., para 11. 
48 Ibid., para 17. 
49 See, for instance, the orders in Case C-328/15, Târșia, EU:C:2016:273; Case C-520/15, Aiudapds, 
EU:C:2016:124. 
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Let’s observe Karner, another case referring to a selling arrangement (a rule on advertising, 
prohibiting certain misleading statements made to sell goods bought at judicial auctions) which 
falls in time roughly halfway (2004) between B&Q and Turnhout. In this case, the Court took 
pains “first of all, to determine whether [the domestic measure] falls within the scope of 
application of Article [34 TFEU].”50 After recalling the Keck doctrine on selling arrangements, 
the Court noted that the measure was not discriminatory and therefore was “not caught by the 
prohibition in Article [34 TFEU]”.51 This was, in other words, a measure which fell under EU 
law but was not precluded (unlike the selling arrangements in Turnhout, which escaped EU 
regulation altogether). The Court, then, proceeded to review the measure’s compliance with 
Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom to impart information). The 
domestic measure was indeed considered to constitute an interference, albeit proportionate and 
justifiable, with the corresponding general principle of EU law. 
 
Like general principles, the Charter applies only to State measures that implement EU law.52 
In other words, a State measure can be reviewed against the Charter only if it falls under the 
scope of EU law. When a measure does not fall under EU law, the Charter is irrelevant. When 
a measure is prohibited by EU law,53 the Charter has no added value in the review of EU-
legality: the measure must be disapplied regardless of whether it respects the Charter or not. 
Consequently, the Charter only matters as a standard of review when it applies to – and 
prohibits – non-precluded measures. In other words, the added value of the Charter as a binding 
source is the possibility that it sanction the illegality of State measures that are governed, but 
not precluded, by EU law.54 
 
The Fransson case provides a good illustration of the application of the Charter to non-
precluded measures.55 The Swedish measure (providing for the criminal prosecution of tax 
wrongdoing) was found to implement EU law, because it sought to discourage and punish tax 
evasion, including VAT evasion, in line with Art. 325 TFEU. Therefore, the Swedish measure 
fell under the scope of EU law and did not raise issues of compliance with the implemented 
norms. However, the application of EU law triggered the application of the Charter too. As a 
result, the Charter could be used as an additional standard of review of the domestic measure. 
Whereas in that case the Court found no obvious breach of the Charter,56 it is only a matter of 
time before a non-precluded measure is declared EU-illegal for breach of the Charter. Two 
cases can be described, briefly, in which this this scenario almost came into being. One deals 
with market freedoms, the other with the rights of EU citizens. In neither case the Court 
sanctioned the EU-illegality of a non-precluded norm for a breach of the Charter – this scenario 
has never materialised so far. Nonetheless, a short discussion of the legal and factual matrix of 
these disputes will show that this outcome should not be ruled out: future cases might warrant 
it and expose the doctrinal intricacies that underpin it. 
 
                                                 
50 See Case C-71/02, Karner, EU:C:2004:181, para 35.  
51 Ibid., para 43. 
52 Article 51(1) of the Charter. 
53 Other than the Charter, of course. 
54 Of course, the Charter also applies to the acts of EU institution, and has already proved to be an important 
touchstone of their legality. See, for instance Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and 
Seitlinger and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats 
and others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:100; Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.  
55 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. 
56 Namely, it concluded that the cumulating of criminal and administrative sanctions did not necessarily breach 
the principle of ne bis in idem protected in Article 50 of the Charter. 
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The first case is Sky Italia.57 Italian law regulates the broadcasting of advertising, setting 
different limits for free-tv and pay-tv operators. Pay-tv channels are granted a lower quota of 
advertising broadcast time. The measure was challenged by Sky in domestic courts, for 
constituting an obstacle to the cross-border provision of services. The Court, asked for a 
preliminary ruling, confirmed that the Italian measure fell under the scope of application of 
Art. 56 TFEU, as it could indeed result in a market barrier. Nevertheless, the Court accepted 
Italy’s explanation that the regulation of advertising was necessary to protect consumers 
against invasive advertising practices. In essence, the measure fell under EU law, but was not 
precluded by it. Since EU law applied, the Charter applied too, and the issue of these measures” 
compliance with the Charter was raised. Sky argued that the limitation on advertising was in 
breach of the Charter’s right of freedom of information and freedom of expression: the rules 
constrained the company’s right to freely determine their broadcasting programming. The 
Court dismissed the claim without even looking into it, referring to the evidentiary 
shortcomings of Sky’s position. It noticed that the file did not contain a sufficient explanation 
of how the domestic rule on competition could harm media pluralism.58  The claim, therefore, 
failed on the evidence but was plausible on the law. The Court conveniently stopped short of 
entering the review on the merits of the autonomous Charter-based claim, even if the basic 
matrix of the case (certain television broadcasters were subject to discriminatory constraints) 
might have sufficed for the Court to instruct the domestic judge about the possible breach of 
Article 11(2) of the Charter. 
 
A more recent example is the case Commission v. UK.59 In infringement proceedings: the 
Commission argued that the UK breached EU law by making child benefits for EU citizens 
conditional upon a requirement of lawful residence. More precisely, the Commission argued 
that the UK was in breach of Regulation 883/2004,60 since the concept of “habitual residence” 
therein61 – an element which States can use to allocate benefits – is a matter of fact and cannot 
be equated to the right to residence under Directive 2004/38 (where residence can be made 
conditional to economic activity). The Court conceded to the Commission that the requirement 
of lawful residence is indirectly discriminatory. However, it noted that justifications are 
available, when they pursue a legitimate interest and are proportionate and necessary: 
 
…it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the need to protect the finances of the host 
Member State justifies in principle the possibility of checking whether residence is lawful 
when a social benefit is granted in particular to persons from other Member States who are 
not economically active, as such grant could have consequences for the overall level of 
assistance which may be accorded by that State.62 
 
Therefore, the UK measure was non-precluded by EU law. Whereas the Commission’s claim 
did not concern any possible breach of the Charter, UK judges might review the measure upon 
application, and set it aside each time it entails an unjustified restriction of Charter’s rights. For 
instance, there might be cases where, in fact, the State’s failure to pay child benefit might cause 
a severe harm to the applicant’s right to private and family life.63 In those circumstances, which 
                                                 
57 Case C-234/12, Sky Italia srl v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, EU:C:2013:496. 
58 Ibid., paras 23-24. 
59 Case C-308/14, Commission / United Kingdom, EU:C:2016:436. 
60 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems. 
61 Article 1, let j). 
62 Case C-308/14, Commission / United Kingdom, EU:C:2016:436, para 80. 
63 See Article 7 of the Charter. 
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are difficult to anticipate but can arise in the practice, the Charter will cause the disapplication 
of otherwise EU-compliant measures. 
 
Neither case discussed above resulted eventually in a national measure being struck down for 
breach of the Charter (despite compliance with EU law at large). This scenario had not arisen 
until recently. These cases are helpful because only for circumstantial reasons (Sky’s under-
substantiated claim under the Charter; the Commission’s lack of interest in Charter-based 
review) did the Charter not matter to the outcome. With slightly changed circumstances, cases 
can arise when non-precluded measures are declared incompatible with the Charter, showing 
the added value of the latter source in a way that has so far been dormant. 
 
Such scenario has finally arisen in the Tele2 Sverige case: national measures falling under the 
scope of EU law (Directive 2002/58) were found to breach the Charter’s rights. However, the 
case is, at a close look, a hybrid case where the review of national legislation effectively was 
pre-determined by the review of EU secondary law. Indeed, the case arose after the annulment 
of the Data Retention Directive for breach of the Charter, and regarded the surviving domestic 
implementing measures. The determination of Charter-incompatibility was just the logical 
prosecution of the DRI case; the human rights-inconsistency was not owed to the choices of 
the domestic legislator, but was primarily caused by EU law.64 
 
E The scope of application of EU law in the common market 
 
The expansive force of EU law, and of the Charter with it, is evident in the field of the 
fundamental freedoms. Any measure capable of raising an obstacle to free movement is, subject 
to EU law. Consider the Pfleger case, intimated above: Austrian law sanctioned the use of 
gambling machine without license. This was considered an obstacle to the freedom of provision 
of services, the measure hence fell under EU law. Automatically, the Charter’s provisions 
protecting property and business rights applied too.65 
 
To be true, cases like this make the added relevance of the Charter hard to discern. The measure 
falling under Article 56 TFEU, the applicable Charter standards on freedom of business and 
right to property were essentially redundant (that is, the same test for breach would refer to 
either Article 56 TFEU or Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter). However, it is worth noting how a 
putatively internal matter, i.e. the establishment of criminal conduct and the applicable 
sanctions, was attracted under the umbrella of EU law, even without breaching it. 
 
At this point, it is easy to understand a basic issue: if the difference between non-application 
and non-preclusion is blurry, it follows by necessity that that the difference between application 
and non-application of EU law is equally blurry. This difficulty can be observed in some recent 
opinions of the Advocate Generals of the Court. 
 
One case in point is C.66 The preliminary reference questioned the compatibility with EU law 
of the Finnish regime of additional taxes on retirement pensions. The relevant standard was the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age. Advocate General Kokott, before turning to 
                                                 
64 Formally, the Charter-incompatible elements of the Data Retention Directive did not require MS to breach the 
Charter upon implementation, see Fontanelli 2016. However, insofar as the Court determined the unlawfulness of 
the Directive the similar conclusion about the implementing measures could only follow, in particular when the 
MS did not bother to limit the interferences upon fundamental rights at the domestic level. 
65 See Articles 15-17 of the Charter. 
66 Case C-122/15, Proceedings brought by C, EU:C:2016:391. 
12 
 
the application of the non-discrimination principle, examined whether the measure fell under 
the scope of EU law at all: 
 
62. According to the judgment in Pfleger, situations governed by EU law also include 
those in which national legislation is such as to restrict the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty. A Member State can justify such a restriction only if, at the 
same time, it observes the fundamental rights provided for in the Charter. 
63. In the present case, the taxation of the taxpayer’s retirement pension might 
constitute a restriction of a fundamental freedom and thus fall within the scope of the 
Charter. After all, the pension received by the taxpayer in 2013 derives at least in part 
from an activity which he previously carried on in a Member State other than the 
Republic of Finland. To that extent, the fact that that pension is taxed in Finland may 
constitute a restriction of the taxpayer’s freedom of movement as a worker.67 
 
These reflections, which incidentally noted that the situation at hand is not purely internal, 
seemed to point to a finding of application of EU law: the tax might indeed constitute a 
restriction of a market freedom. 
 
However, the Advocate General Kokott noted that in the specific case at issue the Finnish 
measure did not, in practice, create any restriction to the freedom of movement of workers.68 
She concluded therefore that the measure does not fall under the scope of EU law at all (which 
is different from saying it is not precluded by it, as the build-up seemed to suggest).69 This 
conclusion clearly treats breaches of the fundamental freedom and the application of EU law 
co-terminous. When there is no breach of the fundamental freedom, EU law does not apply 
(nor does the Charter). Only when a breach arises, the whole system of EU law cum Charter 
comes into play. This idea is convenient because it simplifies the set of possibilities, apparently 
ruling out the possibility of non-preclusion: when application and breach go hand in hand, there 
is no place for application without breach. 
 
The scrapping of the non-preclusion scenario might be, after all, the Columbus’ egg in the field 
of market freedoms. Because in this area the application of EU law depends on the negative 
effects of domestic measures (rather than the attribution of competences), there is no such thing 
as a non-precluded measure: if a measure does not breach a fundamental freedom it is virtually 
irrelevant under the applicable Treaty provisions. The Court, for its part, preferred to ignore 
altogether the transnational aspect, and limited itself to noting that pensions (and taxes thereon) 
fall outside the scope of the equality framework Directive 2000/78.70 As a result, the national 
measures fell outside the scope of EU law, the Charter did not apply and the discrimination 
element was not examined.  
 
                                                 
67 Ibid., footnotes omitted. 
68 Ibid., paras. 65-66. 
69 The judgment of the Court did not address the claim under Article 45 TFEU and only found that Directive 
2000/78, the framework directive on non-discrimination on the workplace, did not apply to the circumstances of 
the case. 
70 Case C-122/15, C, ECLI:EU:C:2016:391, para 23-30. 
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Kokott’s simplification, moreover, does not appear to enjoy consensus among her colleagues. 
Consider the wording of another recent Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet,71 concerning 
a citizenship case72: 
 
If a Treaty provision does not preclude a Member State from refusing a right of residence 
subject to compliance with certain conditions, it follows by definition that the situation in 
question falls within the scope of that provision. If that were not the case, the Court would 
have to decline jurisdiction to answer the question referred.73 
 
The main proceedings concerned a Zambrano-like dispute. A Pakistani woman who had been 
married to a German citizen and resided with him in the UK wished to remain there after he 
moved to Pakistan. She had two kids, who were German citizens. The question was whether 
she had a right to reside in the UK, whether derived from the ex-husband or the children.74 
Wathelet referred to the situation in which a State, after ascertaining that neither the conditions 
of Directive 2004/38 nor the Zambrano-Alopka exception applies, refuses the right to residence 
to a third country national. 
 
In so doing, the Advocate General essentially considered this double test (making sure the 
applicant enjoyed no rights either under Directive 2004/38 or the exceptions) as an EU law-
based precondition for the refusal. He therefore clearly ascribed such measure to the category 
of non-precluded measures, which are covered by EU law precisely because they are not 
prohibited by the Treaties. The reasoning is circular: the ascertainment that EU law does not 
apply cannot, per se, lead to the conclusion that EU law applies to the circumstance.75 In this 
case, this approach would attract under EU law all national immigration policies, even those 
falling outside the scope of EU law. The consequence, of course, would be that the Charter 
would also apply, in lieu of the sole ECHR.76 The confusion is partly due to the language of 
Article 21 TFEU on the right to residence, that is granted “subject to the limitations and 
conditions laid down” in primary and secondary EU law. The language, that perhaps signalled 
the limits of EU law’s application, is formally one of non-preclusion/authorisation. 
 
It can be appreciated how, within a few months, Wathelet and Kokott came to apparently 
opposite conclusions regarding the possibility that measures that do not breach fundamental 
freedoms or citizenship rights be nevertheless covered by EU law – and the Charter. Advocate 
General Spuznar had already expressed his view on whether EU law applies to measures 
                                                 
71 Case C-115/15, NA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:487. 
72 As explained above, citizenship rights and market freedoms share their negative normative value, and sit 
uneasily with the non-preclusion category. This is why cases on citizenship and cases on fundamental freedoms, 
for the purpose of this article, can be studied together. 
73 Ibid., para 122, emphasis added. 
74 Interestingly, the case was almost hypothetical, as she had been granted residence by the UK under the ECHR. 
75 The reasoning is not transparent. In one passage, the Advocate General acknowledges the accessory nature of 
the Charter, see para 126: “[i]t is European citizenship as provided for in Article 20 TFEU that triggers the 
protection afforded by the fundamental rights (more specifically, in this instance, Article 7 of the Charter), not the 
other way round”. In another passage, however, he seemed to posit that the question regarding whether Article 20 
TFEU applies is already one within the ambit of EU law (see para 123). 
76 See the reasoning in C-256/11, Dereci and others, EU:C:2011:734, para 72: “if the referring court considers, in 
the light of the circumstances of the disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the 
main proceedings is covered by EU law, it must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines 
the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter. On the other hand, if it takes 
the view that that situation is not covered by EU law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) 
of the ECHR.” 
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engaging with (but not necessarily precluded by) Article 20 TFEU in his Opinion to Rendón 
Marín,77  
 
…as citizens of the Union, those children have the right to move and reside freely 
throughout the territory of the European Union and any restriction of that right falls 
within the ambit of EU law.78 
 
It is nevertheless possible to re-characterise Spuznar’s dictum and Wathelet’s opinion in NA, 
reading them as a mere rephrasing of the ERT doctrine79 (measures that derogate from EU law 
fall under its scope). It would be possible to reconcile the views of Kokott, Spuznar and 
Wathelet in this light. Whereas only measures that actually restrict fundamental freedoms or 
citizenship rights fall under the scope of EU law, there will be some restrictive measures which 
are justified under EU law. These will be allowed measures (not simply non-precluded) and 
will fall under EU law, whereas all non-restrictive measures will lie outside its scope. This 
construction would be consistent with Kokott’s view (no actual restriction means no 
application of EU law) and with Spuznar and Wathelet’s (an actual restriction means that EU 
law applies, but the restriction might be allowed by EU law). 
 
Similar uncertainties affect national measures concerning areas subject to harmonisation at the 
EU level. The Court has consistently held that Member States’ stricter measures adopted 
pursuant to minimum harmonisation clauses must comply with other provisions of EU law,80 
notably those concerning fundamental rights. Yet, in Hernandez the Court took the view that 
Article 11 of Directive 2008/94, stating that Member States had the option to introduce laws 
more favourable to employees than those laid down in that directive, did not grant Member 
States “an option of legislating by virtue of EU law”, but merely recognised a “power which 
the Member States enjoy under national law”.81 Hence, national measures providing additional 
protection could not “be regarded as implementing EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) 
of the Charter” and, accordingly, “be examined in the light of the guarantees of the Charter”.82  
 
By the same token, in Safe Interenvios, the Court took the view that, in providing that the 
Member States may adopt “stricter provisions” in the field covered by the Money Laundering 
Directive, Article 5 of that directive did not grant the Member States “a power or obligation to 
legislate by virtue of EU law”, but simply recognised a “power which the Member States enjoy 
under national law to provide for such stricter provisions outside the framework of the regime 
                                                 
77 Opinion in Case C-165/14, Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:75. 
78 Ibid., para 120, emphasis added.  
79 Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, EU:C:1991:254. On this 
case, see P Cruz Villalón, ‘‘All the guidance’, ERT and Wachauf’, in M Poiares Maduro & L Azoulai (Eds.), The 
Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 162-169. 
80 See, e.g., Case C-389/96, Aher-Waggon GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:1998:357, para 16: “it is 
necessary to consider whether a Member State which, like the Federal Republic of Germany, has introduced 
stricter noise limits has, in exercising that power, infringed other provisions of Community law, in particular 
Article 30 of the Treaty”; Case C-6/98, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Rundfunkanstalten (ARD) v PRO Sieben 
Media AG, supported by SAT 1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH, Kabel 1, K 1 Fernsehen GmbH, EU:C:1999:532, para 
42: “the attainment of the objective of Directive 89/552 […] is not affected in any way if Member States impose 
stricter rules on advertising […] on condition, however, that those rules are compatible with other relevant 
provisions of Community law”. 
81 Case C-198/13, Víctor Manuel Julian Hernández and Others v Reino de España (Subdelegación del Gobierno 
de España en Alicante) and Other, EU:C:2014:2055, para 44. 
82 Ibid., para 48. 
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established by the directive”.83 Yet, the Court added that that power had to be exercised “in 
compliance with EU law, in particular the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties” 
and noted that, since national stricter provisions could restrict the provision of money transfer 
management services,84 they could only be regarded as permissible “if they are compatible with 
the fundamental rights the observance of which is ensured by the Court” and protected by the 
Charter.85 In sum, although the Charter was held inapplicable due to the lack of an 
implementation link between EU legislation and the relevant national provisions, the latter’s 
impact on cross-border trade put EU law and fundamental rights back into play. 
 
F An unintended harmonisation effect 
 
Whereas the Charter only applies to domestic measures implementing EU law, it is possible to 
observe, or at least speculate over, its spill-over onto non-EU matters. In Fransson, it was made 
clear that a measure could find under the scope of EU law objectively, that is, irrespective of 
whether it was passed with the intention of implementing EU law.86 
 
The unintended implementation of EU law, combined with the attraction mechanism described 
above (EU law attracts under its scope any measure that breaches it), makes it very hard to 
know a priori whether a specific measure will ever engage with EU law, and possibly enter 
into conflict with the Charter. 
 
A case in point it the dispute WebmindLicenses.87 At stake was the practice of Hungarian 
authorities, which transmitted information obtained secretly in pending criminal proceedings 
to the authorities in charge of the parallel tax assessment. In the main proceedings, the case 
was made that the use of this evidence in the tax proceedings breached the principles on 
procedural fairness protected under Articles 41, 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the right 
to defence, and the right to privacy in Articles 7 and 7 of the Charter. In ascertaining first the 
applicability of EU law, the Advocate General Wathelet was very swift: tax assessment 
proceedings concern, in part, crimes involving VAT. In line with the Fransson judgment, 
domestic measures regulating VAT collection fall under scope of EU law. As a result, the 
domestic measures and practice at stake in WebmindLicenses are likewise covered by EU, and 
Art. 51 of the Charter is triggered as a consequence. The Court agreed, and introduced the 
review of the measures at stake against the Charter with a paragraph that encapsulates the 
subject of this article: 
 
It follows that EU law does not preclude the tax authorities from being able in the 
context of an administrative procedure, in order to establish the existence of an abusive 
practice concerning VAT, to use evidence obtained in the context of a parallel criminal 
procedure that has not yet been concluded, provided that the rights guaranteed by EU 
law, especially by the Charter, are observed.88 
 
It is fair to assume that the State rules on the collection and use of evidence in criminal and tax 
proceedings, and on the exchange of information between the respective authorities, were 
                                                 
83 Case C-235/14, Safe Interenvios, SA v Liberbank, SA and Others, EU:C:2016:154, para 79. 
84 Ibid., para 99. 
85 Ibid., para 109. 
86 The Fransson case in this respect is paradigmatic, as it concerns Swedish measures passed before Sweden’s 
accession to the EU. 
87 Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, EU:C:2015:832. 
88 Ibid., para 68, emphasis added. 
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drafted without the intention to implement EU law, nor the awareness that EU law could be 
engaged unintendedly. Advocate General Wathelet’s finding leads to the conclusion that these 
rules, which were never intended to relate to EU law, must comply with the Charter or might 
be set aside in specific circumstances, when the domestic courts find that a breach of the 
Charter occurred. The consequences of this scenario are disruptive: when decisive evidence 
was obtained illegally or the individual could not challenge it in fair proceedings, the ensuing 
decision must he held null and void. The same result follows when the domestic courts are 
unable to perform this check of Charter-compliance: 
 
[domestic courts] must disregard that evidence and annul that decision if, as a result, 
the latter has no basis. That evidence must also be disregarded if the national court is 
not empowered to check that it was obtained in the context of the criminal procedure in 
accordance with EU law or cannot at least satisfy itself, on the basis of a review already 
carried out by a criminal court in an inter partes procedure, that it was obtained in 
accordance with EU law.89 
 
The only wise option available to a rational legislator to avoid these unexpected challenges, it 
seems, is to ensure already at the drafting stage that all pieces of legislation comply with the 
Charter, irrespective of any expected link with the implementation of EU law. This concern 
should also affect the action of executive and police authorities. 
 
In other words, it is to be expected that State authorities, which cannot predict all the factual 
and legal scenarios that might entail a link between EU law and domestic legislation, comply 
with the EU Charter as a matter of convenience, rather than obligation. This was for instance 
the choice of the Swedish legislator, after Fransson. Whereas the Court’s judgment identified 
the implementation of EU law only with respect only with the VAT-portion of the domestic 
tax assessment proceedings, it was much easier to reform the whole system (VAT and non-
VAT) to achieve compliance with EU law. Indeed, the Supreme Court applied the principles 
stated in Fransson and found that domestic law breached EU obligations. It also established a 
new principle whereby individuals who received a tax surcharge and were prosecuted as a 
result of the same tax offence were entitled to a new trial.90 Clearly, the reform did encompass 
both EU-related and non-EU-related tax assessments, and thus resulted in a voluntary (but 
inevitable) Charter-isation of this field of Swedish law. In other jurisdictions, where the 
legislator has not carried out such adjustments, non-VAT fiscal assessments fall outside the 
scope of EU law, and individuals derive no benefit from the Fransson precedent, for instance, 
in the case of combined administrative and criminal sanctions for evasion of income tax.91 
 
This instance is not surprising and is possibly a common occurrence. A rational lawmaker 
might indulge in spontaneous harmonisation, subscribing to the Charter’s obligations even 
when it is not supposed to, for at least two reasons: to anticipate EU-related problem that are 
difficult to predict in theory and to maintain uniformity in the law, where a change relating 
only to the EU-related details would cause unnecessary fragmentation. 
 
G Conclusions 
 
                                                 
89 Ibid., para 98. 
90 On the reception of Fransson in Swedish law, see J Nergelius, ‘The Nordic States and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, in R Arnold (Ed.), The Convergence of the Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 
Dordrecht, Springer, 2016, pp. 97-98. 
91 See C-497/14, Stefano Burzio, ECLI:EU:C:2015:251, para 29-30. 
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Any inquiry into the scope of application of the Charter to Member States inevitably opens a 
can of doctrinal worms. The reasons are obvious: in Fransson and some following cases, the 
Court trumpeted the perfect alignment between the Charter’s application and the application of 
EU law. Knowing when the Charter applies to State measures would therefore require knowing 
when EU law applies to them – a Sisyphean task if there is one, especially in the field of market 
freedoms and citizenship rights. 
 
As explained above, there is no reliable test to exclude a given domestic situation from the 
application of the Treaty rules on the fundamental freedoms. The most used indicators, that is, 
the principle of conferral and the “purely internal situation” test, are imperfect and can yield 
false negatives. This is a problem in itself, which has so far been studied predominantly 
thinking of preclusive situations. When EU law has a prohibitive force, it should be known in 
advance to which domestic measures it applies. 
 
Less attention has been paid to the non-preclusion scenario, but more troubles are well under 
way. The applicability of the Charter in non-preclusion cases creates another scenario of great 
legal uncertainty. Measures that raise no issue of compliance with (other rules of) EU law might 
in fact be prohibited under the Charter. A recurring problem is the characterisation of those 
State measures that deny EU rights (e.g., asylum and residence requests): whereas the State 
would argue that the refusal stemmed precisely from the non-application of the EU norms 
conferring those rights, it could as well be said that, since the conditions for such refusal must 
be reviewed against EU norms, such measures fall under EU law’s scope.92 
 
The Court gives domestic judges little guidance to make this determination, and for law-makers 
and State authorities at large it is virtually impossible to anticipate with certainty whether their 
measures and acts will ever be scrutinised under the Charter. 
 
A possible outcome of this state of affairs is that States behave pragmatically, and “incorporate” 
the Charter among the touchstones of lawfulness for all their acts. However, this unintended 
harmonisation potential of the Charter,93 which derives from the impossibility to determine 
with precision its scope of application, goes against the spirit of the several safeguards 
contained in Article 51(2) of the Charter and Article 6(1) TEU (“the Charter does not extend 
                                                 
92 See, for instance, the distinction that Advocate General Mengozzi sketches in his Opinion to Case C-638/16 
PPU, X, X v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2017:93. On the one hand (para 57), in certain cases “the Court held that the 
situation of the applicants in the main proceedings which were the subject of those cases was not governed by EU 
law and had no connection with that law”. On the other hand, in the case at stake (para 59), “the applicants in the 
main proceedings lodged applications for short-stay visas under an EU regulation which harmonises the 
procedures and conditions for issuing those visas and which is applicable to them. Their situation is indeed 
covered by the Visa Code both ratione personae and ratione materiae.” The Court disagreed and opted decidedly 
for non-application. See C-638/16 PPU, X, X v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173, para 42-43: “the applicants in the 
main proceedings submitted applications for visas on humanitarian grounds, based on Article 25 of the Visa Code 
... In accordance with Article 1 of the Visa Code, such applications, even if formally submitted on the basis of 
Article 25 of that code, fall outside the scope of that code, in particular Article 25(1)(a) thereof, the interpretation 
of which is sought by the referring court in connection with the concept of ‘international obligations’ mentioned 
in that provision.” 
93 Please note that this “spontaneous harmonisation” effect is not restricted to the Charter, but extends to other 
areas of EU law. For instance, the prospect of creating reverse discrimination against their nationals induced 
Member States to amend or repeal their laws as a whole, whereas EU law only required to disapply them vis-à-
vis nationals of other Member States. A case in point is the Italian legislation on pasta products, which the ECJ 
only declared inapplicable to producers from other Member States (Case 407/85, Drei Glocken, EU:C:1988:401, 
para 25), but was eventually struck down as a whole by the Italian Constitutional Court in Judgment no. 443 of 
1997.  
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the scope of application of EU law”). States find themselves in a double-bind: if they do not 
over-comply with the Charter they might face unexpected Charter-based review of their acts. 
In any event, the trade-off between autonomy and compliance is one that should not be required 
by reason of conceptual sloppiness: it is the Court’s responsibility to bring clarity in this area 
of law. 
 
Whereas the really hard cases might lie at the borderline between non-application and non-
preclusion, the state of uncertainty reaches further. National courts are confused by the Chinese 
boxes of the interlocking scopes of application of fundamental rights and EU law. See for 
instance how a Dutch judge phrased a question for preliminary ruling.94 The question refers to 
the compliance with EU law of a concession regarding the tax deduction of studying costs, 
which might raise issues of discrimination on grounds of age. After asking the Court whether 
Directive 2000/78 would apply to the domestic measure (i.e., whether EU law applies at all), 
the judge asked: 
 
[If the Directive does not apply, m]ust the principle of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of age, as a general principle of EU law, be applied to a tax concession on the 
basis of which training expenditure is only deductible under certain circumstances, even 
when that concession falls outside the material scope of Directive 2000/78/EC and 
when that arrangement does not implement EU law?95 
 
The phrasing is striking because the judge lists in the question the exact reasons why the answer 
is no: if the measure fall outside the scope of the Directive and does not implement EU law 
otherwise, EU fundamental principles (whether as general principles or as Charter provisions) 
cannot apply. 
 
One can wonder whether this incredible confusion is the result of the much maligned reasoning 
of the Court in Mangold/Kücükdeveci,96 but one thing is certain: fundamental rights and the 
Charter are routinely treated, whether deliberately (see the choice of the Swedish authorities 
after Fransson) or mistakenly (see the preliminary question above) as an EU source of law that 
applies to Member States without restrictions ratione materiae. The combined effect of this 
trend with the inherently expansive application of the four freedoms will certainly continue to 
challenge the tolerance of Member States. 
                                                 
94 Case C-548/15, de Lange. 
95 Emphasis added. 
96 Respectively, Case C-144/04, Mangold, EU:C:2005:709; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, EU:C:2010:21. 
